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NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves an action commenced by Penelko, Inc.,
for damages and injunctive relief as a result of claimed violation of certain provisions of its lease and for tortious
interference with its theater business.
DISPOSITION BY THE LOWER COURT
Following a trial by jury, a verdict was rendered against
respondent and in favor of appellant in the amount of $65,000.
The lower court entered its judgment on the verdict in the
sum of $65,000 and denied appellant's motions for injunctive
relief and attorney's fees.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent, Price Rentals, Inc., seeks affirmance of the
lower court's orders denying appellant's motions for injunctive relief and attorney's fees.
FACTS
A.

Appellant's Lease And Construction Of Improvements.

The basic facts of the present case are set forth in the
brief of Price Rentals, Inc.

(Appellant) in Appeal No. 16588

from the lower court's judgment on the verdict in the present
case in the sum of $65,000 against Price Rentals, Inc.

Of

particular importance for purposes of this appeal, however,
is appellant's lease for its theater property, which contains
the following provisions:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

There is hereby allotted to the lessee for
parking, a strip of land 70 feet in width and 234
feet in depth, running from the South side of the
above-described parcel to the North side of 9400
South Street, and an additional tract 40 feet in
width and 162 feet in depth, from the parcel next
adjoining the West side of this tract • • • • The
lessee shall install and maintain at a grade established by the lessor and in accordance with the
standard of the Albertsons parking lot, all paving,
lighting, curbs and gutterings, si~ewalks and other
walkways necessary for the possession and use of
the said premises or required by any governmental
authority for the use of and access to the same.
(Emphasis added)
(Paragraph 2.)
All parking facilities, lighting facilities
and open spaces upon the leased premises are to
be used in common with other occupants of property
of the lessor for the maintenance and development
of a shopping center and no barrier shall be constructed or permitted which will bar access to such
parking facilities and access roads by tenants of
other premises or their customers or guests. The
lessor shall provide in leases of adjoining property similar covenants and agreements so that the
lessee shall have similar unobstructed access to
parking, lighting and other common facilities of
adjoining tenants. (Emphasis added) (Paragraph 7.)
It is the intention of the parties that this
shall be a lease of land only for the purpose of
construction of buildings or improvements in connection with an integrated shopping center; that
both of the parties hereto will encourage the
development of adjoining properties for such purpose. • •
(Emphasis added) (Paragraph 8.)
The preamble to appellant's lease further provides that the
land leased to appellants would include "parking space and
access to be set aside and allotted as hereinafter more particularly described."

(Emphasis added)

That parking space

and access area was located between appellant's theater to
the north and 9400 South to the south.
-2-
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At the time of execution of said lease and at the time respondent commenced construction of the improvements referred to
in appellant's complaint, no curbs, gutters, sidewalks or
traffic control improvements had been constructed along 9400
South in front of the common parking lot described in appellant's lease.

(Pages 1762-1766, 2177-2179.)

defined access lane existed in the lot.

Similarly, no

Traffic could enter

from and gain access to 9400 South along the entire southerly
boundary of the parking lot.

Inasmuch, however, as the par-

ties to the lease knew that Sandy City would soon require
construction of such improvements in the lot as the shopping
center was developed, paragraphs 3 and 8 were inserted in
the lease to provide for the construction of curbs, walkways
and defined access routes in and along the front of the parking facility.

(Pages 1762-1766, 2177-2179.)

It is also significant that, following the trial, appellant assigned all of its right, title and interest in its
theater lease and conveyed its interest in the theater building and improvements.

The assignment and conveyance documents

were recorded June 19, 1980, as Entry Nos. 3444396 and 3444397
in the Office of the Salt lake County Recorder.
B.

Lower Court Proceedings And Jury Verdict.

When plaintiff's claims, including alleged trespass resulting from respondent's construction of the above improve-
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ments, were submitted to the jury, the court did not request
a special verdict from the jury with respect to each of those
seven claims.

Respondent, however, requested the court to

instruct the jury to return a special verdict for each
claim of wrongful conduct, including:

(1) construction of a

driveway over the eastern portion of the common parking area,
(2) construction of landscaping and curb at the entrance to
the common parking area South, (3) construction of a flagpole
in the landscaped area, (4) removal of two lights installed
by Utah Power & Light Company in the common parking area, (5)
removal of appellant's theater sign from the access way to
the common parking area, (6) construction of the Perkins'
Cake & Steak Restaurant, and (7) tortious interference with
appellant's theater business.

(Pages 915-917)

Since a spe-

cial verdict form was not submitted by the court, the jury
returned a general verdict only.

(Page 1104.)

Contrary to

appellant's assertions in its brief, the jury did not find
that respondent had violated appellant's lease by placing
landscaping at the entrance to the common parking area, by
constructing a driveway in the common area, by erecting a
flagpole in the landscaped area, or by constructing the Perkins' Cake & Steak Restaurant.
5 and 6)

(Brief of Appellant, pages 2,

In fact, the court held, as a matter of law, and

instructed the jury that respondent did not violate appel-
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lant's lease by constructing the restaurant and that the
restaurant was not located on appellant's leasehold or the
common parking area.

(Page 1203.)

When appellant argued

at the hearing on its motion for a mandatory injunction that
such wrongful conduct had occurred, the court considered
the evidence and denied appellant's motion.
After the jury had returned its verdict and the court
had issued its final order denying defendant's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative,
a new trial, appellant filed a motion for assessment of attorney's fees.

The motion was supported by affidavits of

counsel, claiming total expenditures and fees in the amount
of $30,000, although no evidence of attorney's fees had been
introduced at the trial.

(Pages 1245-1247, and 1225-1230)

On September 11, 1979, the trial court issued a memorandum
decision denying that motion.

(Pages 1649-1659)

In its deci-

sion, the court cited the case of Latses v. Nick Floring, Inc.,
99 Utah 214, 104 P.2d 619 (1940), in which this Court held
that a lease covenant pertaining to attorney's fees does not
run with the land and that a claim for attorney's fees is
barred by lack of privity between a lessee and an assignee of
the lessor.

The lower court then held that, since a covenant

to pay attorney's fees is a personal covenant and not a covenant running with the land, respondent, as assignee of appel-
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lant's lessor, was not liable to appellant for the payment
of such fees.
Appellant now seeks a reversal of the lower court's
orders denying appellant's motions for both injunctive relief
and attorney's fees.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GRANT A
MANDATORY INJUNCTION AND, IN ANY EVENT, THE
QUESTION CONCERNING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IS MOOT
BECAUSE APPELLANT HAS SOLD ITS THEATER AND
LEASEHOLD PROPERTY.
A.

Appellant's Claim For A Mandatory Injunction Is Moot.

Injunctive relief snould not be awarded where events
have rendered such relief unnecessary or ineffectual or where
the question becomes moot due to changed circumstances that
occur during the course of a pending action or appeal.

Paul

v. Milk Depots, Inc., 41 Cal.Rptr. 468, 396 P.2d 924, 926-27
(1964)1

~also

Roosendaal Construction and Mining Corpora-

tion v. Holman, 28 Utah 2d 396, 503 P.2d 446, 448 (1972).

If,

during the course of a pending action, a plaintiff sells the
property to which the requested injunction pertains, he loses
his right to such relief.

In Mendez v. Bowie, 118 F.2d 435,

439 (1st Cir. 1941), cert. den. sub nom Rios v. Bowie, 314
U.S. 639 (1941), the court stated:

-6-
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. The ow~er of the pr~mises, as long as he retains the title'. has an interest in restraining
the trespass whic~ affects the value of his prop~rty. : ... The right of action for an injunction
is an incident of the ownership of the property.
The right of action for damages is personal to the
owner and still remains with him after he has disposed of the property; and when he has ceased to
be the owner it is all there is left of his cause
of action, for, as he has no further interest in
the premises, he has no right to ask for an injunction • . . and, if he has already begun a suit for
an injunction and damages . • • he is no longer
entitled to an injunction because he has ceased to
be the owner . . . • The grantee who has taken title
to the premises alone has an interest in obtaining
an injunction. That right belongs to him exclusively.
Nobody else has any interest in it.
rt is also the law of this jurisdiction that a mandatory
injunction, such as that sought by appellant in the present
action, should be denied where there is little or no benefit
to the complainant.

Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, 552 P.2d

136, 139 (Utah 1976).
In the present case, appellant is barred from seeking a
mandatory injunction, compelling removal of the restaurant,
driveway and curb and landscaping, because it has sold its
theater building and its rights under the subject ground
lease.

Not only has appellant given up its right to injunc-

tive relief as a result of the sale, but the imposition of a
mandatory injunction when appellant no longer has any interest
in the property would confer no benefit on appellant within
the meaning of Kartchner.

Accordingly, the lower court's

order denying appellant's motion for an injunction should be
upheld.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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B.

Appellant Has Failed To Show That It Is Entitled
To A Mandatory Injunction In The Present Action.

Appellant contends that it is entitled to a mandatory
injunction as a matter of law because respondent's construction of the restaurant, curb landscaping, and driveway was
intentional and that placement of the driveway, curb and landscaping in the common parking area was not the result of accident or innocent mistake.

Appellant further states that such

an injunction should be issued without consideration of the
equities of the case where a continuing trespass is ruinous or irreparable, or impairs the just enjoyment of the
subject property.

This position, however, is not supported

by Utah law, nor can it be maintained on appeal since plaintiff failed to meet its burden in proving by clear and convincing evidence that respondent's conduct was intentional or
that the alleged trespasses would be ruinous or irreparable,
or would impair appellant's just enjoyment of the property.
In Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, supra at 138, the
Court stated that a mandatory injunction should be denied
where the granting of such an injunction would be inconsistent with basic principles of justice and equity, even though
it is within the scope of relief available in equity courts.
The Court then observed that, under the facts before it, the
effect of a mandatory injunction would to be destroy for all
practical purposes an enclosed carport valued at $2,000.00
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and that such relief should never be granted where it might
operate inequitably or oppressively.

Id. at 140.

As noted

above, the Court also emphasized that a mandatory injunction
should be denied where there is little or no benefit to the
complainant.

Id. at 139.

The Court's position that equitable factors should be
considered is consistent with that of other jurisdictions.
In Hickman v. Sixth Dimension Custom Homes, Inc., 543 P.2d
1043, 1044 (Ore. 1975), for example, the Court stated that
mandatory injunctions are not regarded with judicial favor
and are used only with caution and in cases of great necessity.

Such relief, according to the court, depends upon

broad principles of equity and, clearly, may be denied in
the court's discretion in accordance with the equities and
justice of the case.

The Court then stated:

The court may refuse an injunction in certain cases where the hardship caused to the
defendant by the injunction would greatly outweigh the benefit resulting to the plaintiff.
The injunction does not issue as a matter of absolute or unqualified right but is subject to the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the authori tes have not uniformly adopted the comparative
injury doctrine, we are convinced that it represents the better rule. Id. at 1045.
See also, Stuart v. Titus, 400 P.2d 797, 800 (Okla. 1965);
Borgen v. Wigglesworth, 369 P.2d 360, 363-64 (Kan. 1962);
Clawson v. Garrison, 3 Kan.App.2d 188, 592 P.2d 117, 128
(Kan. 1979).
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The proper standard to be applied in the present case,
therefore, is whether the hardship caused to respondent by
the requested injunction would greatly outweigh the benefit
resulting to appellant or whether it would operate inequitably or oppressively.

When the equities in the present case

are balanced against the rules set forth by this Court, it is
clear that the granting of a mandatory injunction to a party
who no longer has any interest in the property would create
substantial hardship and unnecessary expense without any benefit to appellant.

Further, inasmuch as Sandy City expressly

required construction of the driveway, landscaped area and
associated

cur~

as a traffic control device to regulate traf-

fic to and from the common parking facility, such an injunction would cause immediate conflict with a requirement imposed by a governmental entity that is not a party to the
present action.

It seems reasonable to conclude that the

court weighed the various burdens and benefits related to
the imposition of such a drastic remedy and concluded that in
light of the substantial hardship that would result to respondent, injunctive relief was not appropriate under the circumstances.

Such a determination would not be an abuse of the

Court's discretion.
It will also be noted that plaintiff never requested the
court to submit to the jury the issue of whether respondent's

-10-
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construction of the subject improvements was intentional,
whether it would be ruinous or irreparable, or whether it
would impair the just enjoyment of the property, as appellant
now argues on appeal.
In this regard, a party seeking injunctive relief has
the burden of proving the elements that entitle him to such
relief.

See Port of Seattle v. International Longshoremen's

and Warehousemen's Union, 52 Wash.2d 317, 324 P.2d 1099, 1100
(1958); E. H. Renzel Co. v. Warehousemen's Union, 16 P.2d
369, 106 P.2d 1, 3 (1940).

The standard of proof necessary

in cases where injunctions are sought is clear and convincing
evidence.

Jewett v. Deerhorn Enterprises, Inc., 281 Ore.

469, 575 P.2d 164, 166 (1978); Borgen v. Wigglesworth, supra
at 363-64; Clawson v. Garrison, supra at 128.

If the court

is in doubt as to whether injunctive relief is proper, such
relief should be denied.

State v. Reid, 190 Kan. 376, 375

P.2d 588, 592 (1962); City and County of Denver v. Glendale
Water and Sanitation District, 380 P.2d 553, 555 (Col. 1963).
Even under appellant's own theory, if respondent's
alleged conduct was not intentional, but rather the result of
accident or innocent mistake, or if the construction of the
above improvements would not be ruinous or irreparable or
would not impair the just enjoyment of the property, appellant would not be entitled to a mandatory injunction.

Agmar
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v. Solomon, 87 Cal.App. 127, 261 P. 1029 (1927); Needle v.
Scheinberg, 187 Md. 169, 49 App.2d 334 (1946).

In deter-

mining the relief to be granted in the present case, the
lower court had a clear understanding of the relative merits
of the claims asserted by the parties.

Appellant had not

requested the court to submit to the jury the questions of
whether respondent's conduct was intentional or accidental
or whether the improvements would impair the just enjoyment
of appellant's property.

In fact, there was substantial evi-

dence to the contrary, and the jury returned a verdict denying
punitive damages, which were instructed to be awarded if
respondent's conduct was intentional or malicious.
Paragraph 3 of appellant's lease expressly provided
that all paving, curbs and gutters and sidewalks would be
constructed in the future in accordance with the requirements
of "any governmental authority for the use of or access" to
the property.

Since appellant's leased property was sur-

rounded by vacant land and it was the intention of the parties under paragraph 8 of the lease that an integrated shopping center would be constructed and that the parties would
encourage the development of adjoining properties for such a
purpose, it was clear that additional facilities would be
constructed in the area surrounding appellant's theater,
all in accordance with Sandy City's requirements.

The court
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may well have concluded, and the denial of injunctive relief
evidences that the Court did conclude, that respondent's
construction of improvements adjacent to and along the edge
of the common parking area was not intentional but was undertaken in accordance with respondent's understanding and interpretation of the above lease provisions, even assuming that
the court did consider the issues of intent and irreparable
injury.

Further, when appellant made its motion for injunc-

tive relief, the court was unable to determine from the general verdict of the jury whether construction of the driveway,
curb or landscaped area violated any provisions of appellant's
lease.

In fact, it was impossible to determine whether the

verdict was based on a violation of the lease provisions
or whether it was based on tortious interference with appellant's business.

In view of such uncertainty and with the

court's express ruling that construction of the restaurant
did not violate any provision of appellant's lease, there
simply was no basis in the record for granting a mandatory
injunction.

The court, therefore, properly denied appel-

lant's motion for an injunction, even assuming for purposes
of argument that appellant's standard for injuctive relief
is correct.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-13-

POINT II
APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S
FEES IN THE PRESENT ACTION.
A.

Plaintiff's Claim For Attorney's Fees Is Barred
By Lack Of Privity.

In Latses v. Nick Flooring, Inc., supra, this Court reviewed the applicability of an award of attorney's fees in a
case similar to the present action.

As in the present case,

the lease in Latses provided that the parties to the lease
agreed to pay all costs and attorney's fees incurred by the
other in the event of litigation to enforce the covenants of
the lease.

In Latses, the landlord-appellant had purchased

the subject property and had taken it subject to the tenantrespondent's lease.

In an action for breach of lease, the

trial court decided in favor of the tenant and awarded him
attorney's fees in the amount of $500.

The landlord took

exception to the award on the basis that there was no privity
between him and the tenant and that the covenant for attorney's fees did not run with the land when he purchased it
from the prior owner.

On appeal, the Court held:

We are of the opinion that appellants are
correct in their version of this part of the case.
This was purely a personal covenant as between
the parties to the contract. Though appellants
purchased the property subject to the tenancy,
they did not expressly agree to abide by all the
terms of the lease. They would be bound only by
covenants in the lease which affected the estate
or the interest in the land conveyed or leased.
Id. at 625.
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The Court therefore vacated the judgment for attorney's fees.
The provision for attorney's fees in appellant's lease
in the present case provides that the successful party in an
action to enforce the terms of the lease would be entitled to
reasonable attorney's fees. However, when appellant's lessors
leased the shopping center to respondent, the lease stated
merely that it was "subject to and together with [the)
Penelko Theater lease"; it did not expressly provide that
respondent would abide by all of the terms of the lease,
including the provision for attorney's fees, nor did it contain a provision that all terms would be binding on the assigns of the parties.
Appellant argues in its brief that the sales documents
in Latses did not provide that the purchase would be subject to the terms of the lease.

(Brief of Appellant, pages

10, 11). It is a basic principle of property law, however,
that a purchaser who buys property subject to an outstanding
lease takes that property subject to the lease, and the Court
so stated in Latses.

Berman v. Sinclair Refining Co., 451

P.2d 742, 745 (Colo. 1969); Eldredge v. Jensen, 89 Idaho
243, 404 P.2d 624, 626 (1965).

It does not matter whether

the sales documents so provide.

The lease of the shopping

center property to respondent in the present case merely
listed the outstanding leases pertaining to the property and
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accomplished no more or no less than what the law imposed in
any event.

Just as in Latses, the property was taken subject

to an existing lease, without any provision wherein respondent agreed to be bound by all terms and covenants of the
lease.

Since, as the Court held in Latses, a covenant for

attorney's fees does not run with the land, appellant should
not be awarded any attorney's fees in this action.

The only

parties in privity with plaintiff under the lease were the
initial lessors, and those parties were dismissed out of the
lawsuit on a motion for a directed verdict upon conclusion of
the evidence.
B.

Appellant's Claim For Attorney's Fees Is
Barred For Failure To Introduce Evidence
Of Attorney's Fees During Trial.

The amount of attorney's fees to be awarded in an action
at law is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of
fact on the basis of proper evidence, just as any other question of fact.

FMA Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc., 17

Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670, 673-74 (1965). The only exception
to that rule is when the parties stipulate as to the amount
or the Court's determination of the amount without submission
of evidence.

See, id., Swain v Salt Lake Real Estate and

Investment Co., 279 P.2d 709, 711 (Utah 1955); Ashworth v
Charlesworth, 231 P.2d 724, 729 (Utah 1951).
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This Court has held repeatedly that a jury trial should
be provided to the parties on all issues of fact raised in
legal causes of action.

Valley Mortuary v. Fairbanks, 225

P.2d 739, 749 (Utah 1950); Petty v. Clark, 129 P.2d 568, 570
(Utah 1942).

In Petty, for example, the Court considered

procedures to be used in resolving legal and equitable issues
raised in the same case and held:
Where the issues are legal issues, the fact
that equitable relief may be prayed for, to carry
into effect the judgment based upon the legal issues, is not sufficient to deprive either party
of his right to have the legal issues submitted
to a jury.
The Court also held that a claim by a plaintiff to recover
money owing under a contract is clearly an issue of fact
which must be submitted to the jury, as is a claim for attorney's fees.

FMA Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc., supra

at 673-74.

Instruction Number 90.50 of the Jury Instructions

For Utah, as approved by a committee consisting of judges and
practicing attorneys who devoted long hours of work to compile a set of jury instructions upon which counsel could rely,
instructs the jury to fix reasonable attorney's fees where
such fees are provided for by contract or statute.

This

instruction reflects the opinion of the judges and lawyers
serving on the committee that the question of reasonable attorney's fees is an issue of fact to be submitted to the jury
where the jury sits as a trier of fact, and not the judge
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presiding over the trial.

This instruction and the rules set

forth above, of course, do not apply to cases tried under Utah
Code Annotated §§34-27-1, 38-1-18, 78-11-10 and 78-37-9.

The

present case, however, does not fall within the above statutory provisions, and respondent's right to a jury trial on
the issue of attorney's fees, as well as all issues of fact,
"should be scrupulously safeguarded." See Abdulkadir v.
Western Pacific Railroad Co., 318 P.2d 339, 341 (Utah 1957).
In FMA Financial Corporation, supra at 673, the Court
also held that it is "fundamental that a judgment must be
based upon the evidence before the court."

The Court further

stated that the plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees was an
issue of fact which would require a proper evidentiary basis:
Thus it was part of the plaintiff's case to
which it had the burden of proving.
Failing to
offer proof of any character on this issue had
the same effect as would the failure to offer
proof as to any other controverted issue. There
is nothing upon which to base a finding.
The defendants' objection that the finding as to attorney's
fees is not supported by any evidence is well
taken • • • • Id. at 674.
Similarly, in Richards v. Hodson, 485 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah
1971), the Court reiterated that it had held on numerous
occasions that attorney's fees cannot be allowed unless there
is evidence to support them.
The position of this Court with respect to the issue of
attorney's fees is consistent with that of other jurisdic-
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tions.

In Crouch v. Pixler, 320 P.2d 943 (Ariz. 1958), for

example, the Supreme Court of Arizona considered whether
the question of attorney's fees should be submitted to the
jury and whether an award of attorney's fees should be based
upon the evidence.
Mason,

The Court cited the Utah case of Mason v.

160 P.2d 730 (Utah 1945), and stated that courts gener-

ally hold that, to justify a finding of reasonable attorney's
fees, there must be evidence in support of such a finding.
The Court, therefore, refused to award attorney's fees to
the plaintiff, stating:
The issue as to reasonable attorney's fees
was not submitted to the jury, and no evidence
was adduced as to the services rendered by the
attorney for the reasonable value thereof.
320
P.2d at 946.
The Supreme Court of Oregon, in Waggoner v. Oregon Automobile Insurance Company, 526 P.2d 578, 582 (Ore. 1974),
also stated:
It has long been settled in Oregon that the
amount of attorney fees to be allowed in both an
action at law and a suit in equity is a question
of fact to be determined by the trier of the facts
upon pleading and evidence in the same manner as
any other question of fact, unless the parties
stipulate that the court may fix the attorney fees
without hearing evidence on that issue.
Therefore, unless an award of attorney's fees in a jury trial
is based upon evidence submitted to the jury, a contracting
party is not entitled to attorney's fees.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-19-

In the present case, appellant submitted a proposed
instruction, patterned after the JIFU instruction regarding
attorney's fees, to the court for submission to the jury.

At

no time during the trial, however, did appellant introduce
any evidence relating to the amount of work devoted to the
case by appellant's attorneys or the value of that work.
Appellant considered this to be a jury issue at the time
of submittal of its proposed instructions to the court, and
even took exception to the court's refusal to submit its
attorney's fee instruction to the jury.

(Page 2529)

When

respondent opposed appellant's motion for attorney's fees
and raised before the lower court the arguments set forth
above, appellant did not argue, either in its brief or at
the hearing, that the court had written on its proposed
instruction "denied -- to be determined by the court".
page 1653)

(See

Instead, for the first time in this action and

for the convenience of argument, appellant takes a contrary
position, stating that it relied on the court's apparent
position, as reflected by the above notation, that the court
would determine the attorney's fees, when neither party to
this action knew of the court's position until after the
court issued its memorandum decision nearly four months after
the jury had rendered its verdict.

(See affidavits of coun-

sel for respondent [Pages 1667-68 and 1671-762), stating that
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the question of who should set the amount of attorney's fees
was never raised during the trial or in chambers and that
counsel did not become aware of the court's position that it
would fix attorney's fees, until September 1979, when they
received the court's memorandum decision.

Counsel for appel-

lant filed no opposing affidavits.)
C.

Appellant's Claim of Attorney's Fees Cannot Be
Sustained Because It Is Impossible To Determine
Whether The Verdict Was Based Upon Tortious
Conduct Or Breach of Lease.

As a general rule and in the absence of any contractual
or statutory provision therefor, attorney's fees incurred by
the plaintiff in litigation are not recoverable as an item of
damages, either in a contract or a tort action.

Holland v.

Brown, 394 P.2d 77, 80 (Utah 1964); Erisman v. Overman, 358
P.2d 85, 88 (Utah 1961); 22 Am. Jur.2d, Damages §165.

In the

present case, plaintiff set forth two basic causes of action.
First, appellant alleged that respondent had violated certain provisions of its lease, and second, that respondent had
entered into a willful and malicious course of conduct designed
to destroy plaintiff's business and force abandonment by
plaintiff of its theater and lease.

The first of appellant's

claims is therefore based upon a lease, which contained a
provision regarding attorney's fees, while the second cause
of action is based upon a tort for which attorney's fees are
not permitted under Utah law.

Both issues were submitted by
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the court to the jury without use of a special verdict form,
although respondent submitted a special verdict which would
have required the jury to specify the claims upon which the
verdict was based.

Consequently, when the jury returned its

verdict in the present case, it could not be determined whether the verdict was based upon breach of contract or tortious
injury to appellant's business.

Appellant, therefore, is not

entitled to recover attorney's fees.

To have asked the

court to indulge in speculation as to the basis upon which
the verdict was rendered would have clearly been erroneous.
D.

The Lower Court Lacked Jurisdiction To Consider
Appellant's Motion For Attorney's Fees Because
The Court's Order of July 2, 1979, Became Final,
And Both Parties Filed Notices of Appeal Before
The Motion Was Heard By The Court.

Upon conclusion of the trial in the present case, the
Court reserved for a future determination only the issue
of injunctive relief.

That issue was resolved by way of

a subsequent motion, which was heard by the Court on June
27, 1979.

On or about July 2, 1979, the Court entered its

order denying appellant's motion for injunctive relief and
respondent's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
or in the alternative, a new trial.

No other motions were

made by any of the parties to this action following the trial
and prior to issuance of the July 2, 1979, order.

Accordingly,

the court's order denying the respective post-trial motions
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of the parties became final within the meaning of Rule 72(a)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the time for filing
an appeal from this final order began to run in accordance
with Rule 73(a).
On July 9, 1979, however, appellant filed its motion
for attorney's fees.

Before that motion was heard by the

court, both respondent and appellant filed timely notices
of appeal and designations of record on appeal.

However,

appellant did not call to the court's attention the issue
of attorney's fees prior to the conclusion of the trial,
nor did it make any effort to reserve the issue of attorney's
fees for a later determination by the court.
In the absence of a judgment reciting that the court
would retain jurisdiction over the issue of attorney's fees
until a later proceeding, the court's judgment became final
on July 2, 1979.

See Walker, Inc. v. Thayn, 17 Utah 2d 120,

405 P.2d 342, 343 (1965).

Appellant did not make any post-

trial motions to alter or amend the judgment in accordance
with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, nor did it make
any motion to toll the running of the time for appeal.
Further, even if appellant's motion for attorney's fees
were properly filed, plaintiff subsequently abandoned that
motion by filing its notice of appeal.
Appeal and Error, §306-307.

See 4 Am.Jur.2d,

In this regard, it should be
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I

vides, if any additional claims remain to be determined by the
trial court prior to appeal, a party to an action may file a notice preserving his right to appeal on the decided issue until a
final determination is made of any remaining claims.

Appellant

did not file such a notice in the present case and thereby
waived its right to have any further post-trial motions considered by the court.

Accordingly, when both parties filed their

notices of appeal from the court's final order of July 2, 1979,
jurisdiction over the case became vested in the Utah Supreme
Court and appellant lost any right to seek attorney's fees.
CONCLUSION
The lower court properly exercised its discretion in
denying appellant's motion for injunctive relief.

Furthermore,

appellant sold all of its interest in the leased property and
no longer has a claim for such relief.

The court also prop-

erly denied appellant's motion for attorney's fees for the
reasons stated above.

Both rulings should now be sustained

on appeal.
Respectfully submitted this 25th day of

eptember, 1980.
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I hereby certify that I served two copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brief by mailing the same, postage prepaid,
respectively to William H. Henderson, 431 South 300 East,
Suite 208, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; and Mark S. Miner,
Newhouse Building, Suite 525, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101.
Dated this
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